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PROJECT MANAGER SOLDIER WEAPONS

SOLDIER WEAPONS ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT 6-03

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

31 July 2003

PM Soldier Weapons

PM Maneuver Ammunition Systems

United States Army Infantry Center, Directorate for Combat Developments, Small Arms Division

TACOM - Armament Research Development & Engineering Center

Soldier Weapons Assessment Team – Iraq

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Executive Summary ii

Purpose iii

Background iii

Methodology iii

Team Composition iii

External Support iii

Units Interviewed iv

Major Findings iv

Conclusions x

Recommendations x

Chapter 2. Crew-Served Weapons 1

MK19 AGL 2

M2 HMG 6

M240B MMG 10

M249 SAW 17

Chapter 3. Individual Weapons 23

M16 Series Rifles 24

M203 GL 33

M9 Pistol 38

Chapter 4. Special Applications Weapons 42

XM107 Long Range Sniper System 43

M24 Sniper Weapon Systems 44

Shotguns 48

Appendix A. Weapon System Descriptions 51

Appendix B. Survey Demographics and Units Interviewed 55

Appendix C. Assessment team talking/focus points 57

Chapter 1. Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Purpose. The Small Arms Assessment Team was formed to support Project Manager Soldier Weapons (PMSW) assessment of small arms performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Tasks were to assess the current state of weapons, ammunition and accessories directly managed by PMSW: M9 Pistol to MK 19 AGL and determine what worked well and what did not.

Background. Since the initiation of OIF, a number of reports have come from the theater describing problems and lessons learned on a variety of soldier equipment including weapons. PM Soldier Weapons chartered a weapons team to conduct a comprehensive assessment of weapons performance in OIF. The team consisted of representatives from the U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC) Directorate for Combat Developments, Small Arms Division (DCD, SAD), Project Manager Maneuver Ammunition Systems (PM MAS), TACOM Armaments Research, Engineering and Development (TACOM - ARDEC), and was led by the Assistant Project Manger (APM) Soldier Weapons. The team conducted a three week in-country assessment from 10 Jun 03 to 7 Jul 03.

Methodology. The team interviewed unit senior leadership and soldiers (primary users) on The Operational Suitability, Lethality, and Maintainability and Reliability of weapons, ammunition and weapon accessories while conducting operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Individual and/or group interviews were conducted, depending on the unit’s operational tempo (OPTEMPO). The information gathered was consolidated to establish a data base for future reference. Unit AARs or published lessons learned were sought for inclusion into the data base. A host of devices were used to capture data points and to establish a photo gallery, video, and audio library for future analysis. Soldier demographics and units were captured in order to exhibit the sample size and grouping. The team’s goal was to use this extensive data base and representative sample to corroborate and serve as the basis of the team’s conclusions. The team then analyzed the findings and provided recommendations that may affect operational requirements, material development, production, maintenance, or fielding priorities.

Team Composition. The team was made up of both combat and material developers. They jointly interviewed soldiers, analyzed the data, and provided the recommendations as a team. The team members were:

PM Soldier Weapons (Team Lead)

PM Maneuver Ammunition Systems

TACOM – Armament Research Development & Engineering Center

United States Army Infantry Center, Directorate for Combat Developments, Small Arms Division

External Support. The team also received outstanding support from external sources that facilitated the team’s mission. Army Materiel Command – Field Assessment Science and Technology AMC-FAST and the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) were well established in the Area of Operation (AOR) and provided support. Their familiarity of the AOR and established unit contacts enabled the team to move about and gain access to units more easily. Moreover, this joint effort with AMC-FAST and the REF provided each team insight and assistance in their mission. Soldiers and units expressed shortcomings and desired capabilities to further enhance their operations which translated to Operational Needs Statements, potential interim fixes, and future requirements.

Units Interviewed.

Over 1000 soldiers were interviewed from the units listed below.

173d ABN Bde: Kirkuk, Iraq

1-508th ABN BN

2-503d ABN BN

2-14^th IN BN, 10^th Mountain Division: Erbil, Iraq

3d Infantry Division

3d BDE Cp New Jersey, Kuwait

1^st Bde, Baghdad, Iraq

1-41^st IN

4^th Infantry Division, Tikrit, Iraq

1-22 IN

1^st Armored Division, Baghdad, Iraq

1-36 IN

1-37 AR

2-3 FA

2-325 AIR, 82d Airborne Division

101^st AASLT DIV, Mosul, Iraq

1-502d

2-502d

526^th FSB

501^st MP Co, Baghdad, Iraq

Major Findings.

Generally, weapons, ammunition and accessories functioned properly and reliably during Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, soldiers and units continue to purchase commercial items, fabricate or resort to field expedience to overcome shortcomings in the AOR.

Operational Suitability:

The Iraqi desert was very challenging and harsh, but the current weapons, ammunition and accessories the soldiers took to battle functioned, withstood the elements and were lethal. The weapons that stood-out were the M2 HMG, M240B MMG and the M4 MWS. The M2 HMG and M240B MMG were praised mostly for their ruggedness and reliability. The weapon’s reliability was most important to the soldiers. The M4 MWS’ modularity, size and weight was well received by soldiers issued this weapon system. It enabled soldiers to conduct clearing operations in urban terrain and easily transition from day to night operations.

Although the M4 MWS was reliable, the team observed light primer indentation occurrences in the M16 series rifles: M4s and M16s. As soldiers locked, loaded and cleared weapons prior to and after operations or as directed, the primer was indented. Upon return to CONUS discussions with weapons engineers revealed that each time a cartridge is chambered in an M16 Series Rifle or M4 Series Carbine, a slight indentation is made on the primer. This is caused by contact of the free-floating firing pin against the cartridge primer as the bolt closes. This is a function associated with normal operation of the weapon. The Army conducted tests to investigate the effects of multiple detents on 5.56mm ammunition. No slam fire, or accidental discharges occurred.

However, cartridges are not intended to be repeatedly re-chambered as this may de-sensitize the primer and/or deform the body of the cartridge case sufficiently to cause misfires. The potential for a misfire may occur in as few as 10 to 20 lock and load cycles of the same cartridge. No misfire occurrences were directly observed from indentations but soldiers relayed some occurrences of accidental discharges when going through the clearing procedures and one soldier experienced a misfire – from a round cycled through the chamber numerous times. Further testing is planned to more accurately quantify these conditions and establish the need of a Maintenance Advisory Message (MAM).

As stated above, soldiers rank reliability and durability as key weapon characteristics and are not willing to trade them for anything – to include weight. Similarly, soldiers do not consider the weapon as part of their load, but rather as an enabler. They are willing to carry the weight if the weapon or device increases his lethality. This is best illustrated by soldiers purchasing their own magnified optics and the strong desire to carry an additional sidearm or shotgun for defensive and offensive purposes. Lethality is more important to the soldier than any other consideration or factor.

Figure 1. A soldier modified M16A4. Note the commercial ergonomic pistol grip, bipod and optic.

Load carrying systems is a prevalent issue in Iraq. Several systems were used in theater: the All-purpose, Lightweight, individual Carrying Equipment (ALICE) Load Carrying Equipment (LCE), Load Bearing Vest (LBV), and the Modular Lightweight Load-Carrying Equipment (MOLLE), but the MOLLE is the only system developed to interface specifically with the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). The LCE, LBV and the M203 Grenade Vest were too bulky and cumbersome and did not interface well with the IBA, but soldiers used many of the ALICE components and attached them to the IBA. The two units issued the MOLLE attached the pouches directly to the IBA and used other items from the system to carry mission essential equipment. Load carrying issues were less pronounced in these units. Several units and soldiers purchased commercial load carrying systems and/or pouches in order to achieve better form, fit and function with the IBA. A number of commercial items, modifications and fabrications on current items, and field expedient methods were observed to address this issue. Soldiers continue to purchase items from catalogs or the internet from companies such as Black Hawk, Tactical Tailor or Eagle in order to overcome this shortcoming.

Figure 2. Black Hawk ammunition carrying system purchased by the soldier.

Figure 3. ALICE ammunition pouches attached to the IBA.

The M4 Modular Weapon System (MWS) is issued primarily to light infantry, Special Forces, and tank crewmen. It was evident that clearing operations in Iraq were not limited to infantrymen, light or mechanized. The majority of the force deployed in Iraq was mechanized units and issued the M16A4 MWS which proved cumbersome in the confines of tracked vehicles and during clearing operations in Baghdad. Other soldiers (non-Infantry) were also conducting these types of operations and are typically equipped for personal defense with an M9 pistol. These operations were typically conducted at night, but the majority of the soldiers did not have laser aiming devices, Close Combat Optics (CCOs), or tactical flashlights and did not have the interfaces to attach accessories to the Mil Std. M1913 rail system. Many soldiers used field expedient methods to attach items.

The majority of Combat Support and Combat Service Support soldiers are vehicular mounted and the M16 is cumbersome to place into operation while in the confines of the vehicle. At times, the length of the M16 is awkward and interferes with MOS specific tasks. Due to combat support and combat service support unit’s related tasks and missions, a more compact weapon or carbine may be needed.

Lethality:

It is apparent that the close range lethality deficiency of the 5.56mm (M855) is more a matter of perception rather than fact, but there were some exceptions. The majority of the soldiers interviewed that voiced or desired “better knock-down power” or a larger caliber bullet did not have actual close engagements. Those that had close engagements and applied Close Quarters Battle (CQB) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) – controlled pairs in the lethal areas: chest and head and good shot placement, defeated the target without issue. Most that had to engage a target repeatedly remarked that they hit the target in non-vital areas such as the extremities. Some targets were reportedly hit in the chest numerous times, but required at least one shot to the head to defeat it. No lethality issues were voiced with targets engaged at 200 meters and beyond. It is apparent that with proper shot placement and marksmanship training, the M855 ammunition is lethal in close and long range.

Units deployed in Iraq are experiencing the same issues with the Generation I M68 Close Combat Optic (CCO) raised from Afghanistan. Condensation inside the body, loose power switches, poor durability and short battery life were all primary issues raised. However, units that received improved M68s (Gen II) through the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) did not have any issues – the sights were well received and did not experience the same issues as the Gen I CCOs. All the soldiers equipped with the Gen II M68s reported longer battery life. The antireflection device (ARD) provided an unexpected advantage in Iraq – reduction of glare. Soldiers were able to distinguish the red dot better in direct sunlight.

Magnified optics was used more during OIF. Soldiers and units purchased several types and brands, but the most popular was the Trijicon, Advance Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG) 4x, a Special Operations Peculiar Modification (SOPMOD) component. Leaders primarily used these sights for target detection and identification, but the majority of the soldiers used the capability to acquire and engage targets. Soldiers were more confident in their ability to engage targets with more precision. There is some debate to the utility of a magnified optic during CQB situations. This item is part of the Rapid Fielding Initiative.

Soldiers voiced a need for an integrated sight. Although the accessories enabled soldiers to acquire and engage targets more effectively, weapon real estate was at a premium. Soldiers were limited to mounting a day or night sight and were required to boresight and/or zero the sights individually each time they were mounted. Soldiers strongly suggested a combinatorial day/night sight with an integrated laser aiming device and capable for close and long range engagements.

As the mission transitioned from combat operations to SASO, soldiers were faced with different situations that did not warrant deadly force. Several soldiers voiced the need for a non-lethal capability. There are six brigade Non-lethal Mission Capability Kits (NLMCK) in theater, but they are allocated to the Provost Marshal. It was apparent that the Infantry Divisions and brigades were not aware that the kits were available in theater. This issue was an asset visibility and logistics issue, but units began to requisition the NLMCK upon notification of its availability.

Maintainability/Reliability:

Though were minimal maintainability and reliability issues raised, a number of universal issues were voiced related to the M249 SAW maintainability, the M203 durability, lubrication types, and magazines. SAW gunners were unanimously dissatisfied with the complexity of the M249 SAW. Its numerous small parts encumbered field stripping and were easily lost. Some SAW gunners resorted to extremely unorthodox methods to retain weapon availability. The M249 SAW was the most problematic weapon in the theater.

Figure 4. M249 SAW with field expedient repair.

The biggest issue among M249 SAW gunners is the 200 round plastic ammunition box. Some box and weapon interfaces were observed as weak and unreliable. SAW gunners consistently remarked that the box habitually falls-off no matter the movement technique: walking or rushing. The spring tension is insufficient to retain the box in the slot. Soldiers are using bolts, screws or wire to act as a retaining pin in order to keep the box from slipping from the slot. The box was extremely brittle and prone to break, especially at the box and weapon interface. Discussions with weapons engineers upon return to CONUS revealed that the weak interfaces were previously addressed in a change of the plastic ammunition box design. Some of the problems encountered may have been due to issue of the old design ammunition boxes. Also, the ammunition tends to rattle against the box and soldiers were using MRE cardboard or moleskin to buffer the noise. However, the M249 SAW 100 round soft Combat Ammunition Pack (CAP) was universally praised and was preferred over the 200 round plastic box. Gunners conveyed that they would rather repack their ammunition basic load in several 100 round soft pouches than use the 200 round plastic box.

The M203 GL was most affected by the desert environment. Sand and dirt migrated into the trigger housing and clogged or jammed the safety. This issue is compounded by excessive lubrication. Fine powdery sand easily entered this area and could not be prevented without placing the weapon in a hermetically sealed bag. Additionally, the hand guards tended to slip-off. It is believed that the extreme heat caused the glue to melt and the bonding properties to break-down.

No one type of lubricant stood-out as the best in OIF. A wide variety was used to include: CLP, Graphite, Motor Oil, Strike Hold®, LSAT, Gun Wipes®, and Mil Tech ®. But no matter the lubricant, the common denominator was periodic maintenance. Every soldier described cleaning the weapon, applying lubrication, removing the excess lubricant and periodically brushing-off the dust. When soldiers conducted daily operator level maintenance and applied a light coat of lubricant (regardless of type) to the weapon, the weapon functioned reliably. The best lubricant of all was determined to be soldier elbow grease.

Numerous weapon magazine reliability issues were cited by soldiers. Many of the M16 series and M9 magazines exhibited the same issues raised in Afghanistan. Several of the magazines failed to feed. It is evident that the spring tension was inadequate to feed the rounds in several magazines observed. Some of the M9 magazines had no tension at all. Several observed M16 magazines were difficult to seat in the weapon, or the feed lips tended to spread apart. Soldiers resorted to loading less than 30 rounds into the magazine. These issues may be attributed to worn out magazines and from a lack of maintenance. However, these issues were not cited with the Beretta® or OKAY® magazines. OKAY® magazines were fielded under the Rapid Fielding Initiative.

Equipment Shortcomings – Unit or Individual Purchases:

Due to fielding priorities, many units deployed to OIF were not fielded items from the RFI. In fact, the majority of the units that deployed to OIF did not receive RFI and were forced to supplement individual equipment with unit or personal purchases. Some soldiers were purchasing these items from catalogs while deployed. The items range from load bearing equipment to weapon sights and optics. Many, if not all these items are standard Army issue and are available in the supply system.

Some of these items are listed below:

• Rifle Accessories:

– Magnified Rifle Optics (Trijicon, Leupold, or Bushnel etc…)

– Reflex Sights (EO Tech or Trijicon)

– Tactical Flashlights (Surefire)

– Bipods (Harris)

– Back-Up Iron Sights (KAC or Swan)

– Tactical Slings (Black Hawk, Spec. Ops etc…)

• Sniper Accessories

– Spotting Scope (Leupold)

– Ballistic Tables

– Log Book (Black Hawk)

– Camouflage Paint

– Improved Bipod (Harris)

• Load/Ammunition Carrying System(s)

– MOLLE-type pouches for IBA (Black Hawk)

– Ammo Bearer Bags (Tactical Tailor or London Bridge)

– Three-Day Assault Packs (Black Hawk or Eagle)

– Tactical Vest (Black Hawk)

• Tactical Pistol Leg or Shoulder Holsters (Black Hawk)

• Pistol Visible Aiming Laser

• Crew-Served Weapon Sighting Systems (Israeli Wheel)

Conclusions.

Soldiers are confident that their weapons systems will defeat any threat in Iraq and they are generally well maintained, despite harsh and extreme desert conditions. They have and will do whatever it takes to keep their weapons functional. Units and soldiers were forced to procure commercial items to meet shortcomings in equipment – before and during operations. However, units that received items (four brigades) through the Rapid Fielding Initiative had minimal equipment issues.

Recommendations

In the near term, units currently in theater require an immediate remedy to enable them to accomplish their missions. Units engaged should receive first priority for RFI items and equipment fielding. Second priority should go to units about to deploy into the theater. Based on the current situation, the fielding plan must be adjusted to fill units deployed or pending deployment and not on the basis of the peacetime Army Order of Precedence (AOP). It is readily evident that the majority of the units that experienced issues with current equipment and conveyed shortcomings are units lower in the AOP.

In the mid to long term, materiel and requirements development must be reviewed to ensure that operational needs are met. Materiel quality and production must be scrutinized and improved or accelerated, where necessary. Moreover, the requirements must address the shortcomings expressed by the field.

Finally, a similar team should follow-up on the findings and recommendations outlined in this report. This team must, similarly, survey units in the theater and those that have redeployed to assess whether their issues have been resolved.

Chapter 2. Crew-Served Weapons

Section I. MK19 Grenade Machine Gun (GMG) and 40mm Ammunition

General Discussions:

The MK19 GMG received great appreciation and praise by the warfighters who used it. Some of the comments included high rate of indirect fire, lethality and ease of operation as well as overall accuracy of ammunition.

Although the weapon functioned well under the combat conditions in the AOR, soldiers would like a number of improvements. These improvements are as follows:

Section I. a. MK19 GMG

Issue #1: Night Capability

Discussion: Most units deployed for OIF lack the capability to engage targets with the MK19 during limited visibility. The MK19 TWS bracket is the primary interface for the Heavy Thermal Weapon Sight (HTWS) with the MK19. Not all units are issued the HTWS or the bracket; therefore, a majority of units interviewed do not have the capability to engage targets during limited visibility. Some units have motorized platoons with MK19s in each company and have a limited number of AN/TVS-5s but no thermal capability or the interface to mount the devices. Units interviewed desire an integrated sight that provides thermal, day view optic, laser range finder (LRF) and laser aiming capabilities.

Recommendation: Provide additional production funding for additional procurement and immediate fielding of the HTWS and TWS Bracket to units not currently fielded these items. Second, develop a lightweight integrated sighting system which incorporates day/night, thermal, laser range finder and laser pointing capability.

Issue #2: Gun Mounts

Discussion: The pedestal and ring mounts were not robust enough for daily operations. All of the mounts observed had a number of deficiencies. The mounts strained under the weight of the system while driving under combat conditions. The weight of the gun and the ammunition jarred and shook the mount excessively. Some of the mounts exhibited catastrophic failures, but units continued to use them – with fabricated reinforcements, in order to retain the capability. The gun mounts do not deadline the vehicle. Some of the mounts did not lock the gun in place or the gun had a lot of movement which contribute to loss of accuracy. This issue is not as high in the unit priority as ensuring that rolling stock is fully mission capable (FMC).

Figure 5. Soldier demonstrating the degree of movement of the MK19 in the stowed and locked position.

Recommendation: Mounts should be replaced immediately to ensure operational efficiency of the weapon system. Second, develop a more robust mounting system for this weapon system.

Figure 6. Structural failure at the base of the pedestal mounts. Failures were observed with MK19 and M2 mounted.

Issue #3: Gunners had difficulty engaging line of sight (LOS) targets or moving targets.

Discussion: The weapon is employed as a direct fire weapon, but the time of flight and trajectory of the 40mm HEDP reduces the units capability to accurately or quickly engage targets: vehicular and personnel, at medium to long range. Several gunners desire the capability to “point-and-shoot.” Units have transitioned from combat operations to Stability and Support Operations (SASO), but the threat remains. Units establish traffic control points (TCPs) and must be able to engage targets on high speed avenues of approaches. Furthermore, the high trajectory of the 40mm may pose a problem in the cities with low power or telephone wires and lamp posts. The possibility of a premature detonation while in flight is greater within an urban area.

Recommendations: Develop a system that provides a “point-and shoot” direct LOS engagement capability.

Section I. b. MK19 40-MM Ammunition

Issue #1: The current round configuration can not be relinked in the field.

Discussion: When locking and loading or going from amber to red status, the function of placing a round in ready fire position eliminates that round from reuse if not fired before they return to base. The round is ejected upon clearing and must be turned in for disposal. What’s needed is a reliable way to reuse the ammo through re-linking. One soldier demonstrated what he did to replace the link correctly in the belt using a Gerber tool.

Recommendation: Review link and linking capabilities to determine if there is a suitable method for the user to relink the ammunition.

Issue #2: Arming distance

Discussion: For MOUT operations the weapon is virtually useless due to the arming distance of the round being too long. They would like a round that arms earlier, but is still safe to use.

Recommendation: Look at minimum safe distance for arming and determine if there is any opportunity to reduce the distance and still maintain the safety of the gunner.

Issue #3: Flatter trajectory

Discussion: Continuing with the above thought they would also like to see a round of ammunition that they could use in a direct fire mode rather than arcing angle. In this manner they could more efficiently fire on rooftops, at doors, etc., without too much collateral damage.

Recommendation: Review the weapon system performance parameters and asses whether a direct fire capability exists.

Issue #4: Excess dunnage

Discussion: The ammo is packed in cans with what they consider to be excessive internal packaging material. This material must be completely removed prior to firing. In a combat mode the time to unpack is excessive and could adversely expose the soldier to enemy fire.

Recommendation: Current packaging configurations protect the ammunition and fuze safely during rough handling and transportation. Alternative methods should be examined to determine if there is a way to reduce the packaging dunnage.

Issue #5: Lethality

Discussion: While the HEDP round performed reasonably well, soldiers expect the ammunition to exhibit greater effective/destructive power. As such they would like to see a round that exhibits greater blast effects. Possibly a single purpose round like an HE round

Recommendations: A High Explosive only configuration has been typed classified, but is no longer being produced. Operational requirements should be re-examined and appropriate action initiated.

Issue #6: Airburst munitions

Discussion: They would also like to see a round with airburst capability and greater on target fragmentation/kill potential.

Recommendations: Assess availability of an airburst capability. Utilize commercial off the shelf, non developmental items or developmental programs as appropriate.

Issue #7: Multipurpose door breaching munitions

Discussion: As in all MOUT engagements there is the expressed desire to multiplex your weapon system to include a door breaching capability. In theater exterior doors are steel framed, hollow steel panels approximately one inch total thickness. A round that could be fired from a MK19 GMG into such a door, breaching it is desired.

Recommendations: Assess availability of door breaching capability. Utilize commercial off the shelf, non developmental items or developmental programs as appropriate

Issue #8: Canister round

Discussion: A desire was also expressed for a shot type round that would be effective in either MOUT or Stability and Support Operations (SASO). In MOUT it would enable use of the MK19 as a defensive weapon during SASO and would dissuade crowds from advancing on small units.

Recommendations: Accelerate the production and fielding of the XM1001 Canister round.

Issue #9: Non-lethal

Discussion: Soldiers would like to see some sort of non-lethal ammunition for peace keeping roles. As it stands in the currently defined OPTEMPO, the MK19 is a dead weight system that is being carried about.

Recommendations: Review possibility for non-lethal rounds in high velocity 40mm

Section II. M2 .50 Caliber Machine Gun and .50 Caliber Ammunition

General Discussions:

General acknowledgement from the majority of the soldiers interviewed is that the system performed well in all engagements. On more than one occasion, the firepower and noise alone was enough to cause enemy combatants to disburse and flee (psychological effect). Soldiers were generally pleased with the durability, reliability, rate of fire and lethality that the M2 provided during the conflict. They successfully engaged and destroyed targets (light armor, buildings and personnel) between 50-2000 meters without experiencing any major malfunctions or breakages of the weapon system. However, most engagements were not in excess of 1000 meters. A large number of soldiers commented that the M2 is “The best weapon in the Army.”

The M8 round was the principle round used linked with the M17 Tracer. Effectiveness against tactical and entrenched targets was demonstrated. Whenever the system was engaged on a target it was defeated. A review of ammunition quality issues did not reveal anything of concern. The ammo is used directly out of the ammo box packed at the production facility and unless loaded into larger containers such as the M548 ammunition box is not touched again. Troops were general impressed with the ammunition capability.

Soldiers had high praise for the overall performance of the M2 and .50 caliber ammunition issues were for the most part logistics related. However, they did have some issues and recommendations as well. The issues and recommendations are as follows:

Section II. a. M2 .50 Caliber Machine Gun

Issue #1: Optics

Discussion: A number of units are still equipped with the AN/TVS-5 Night Sight. Soldiers felt that this sight is too bulky and outdated to be used on this weapon system. The clarity of the sight is poor, the mounting bracket is weak (breaks a lot) and the gunner cannot properly engage targets with the sight (eye piece is not practical). Soldiers expressed that they would like to have some type of bracket that they could use to mount an AN/PEQ-2 onto the weapon. The AN/PEQ-2 along with the soldier’s night vision goggles (AN/PVS-7Ds/14s) would give the gunner the capability to accurately engage targets at night. Some units were equipped with AN/PAS-13s. Soldiers in these units complained that these systems were also bulky and that gunners experienced a heat bloom (white-out) off the barrel when it heats up, thus impairing their vision. They felt that a lightweight day/night/thermal sight with a capability to view the target without having to place your eye onto the eyepiece would be more effective. Additionally, a large majority of soldiers interviewed indicated that they would like to have an optic that provided them with more accuracy (first round effects on target).

Recommendations: In the near term, develop a rail/interface system that would allow the soldier to mount an AN/PEQ-2 onto the M2. As a far term solution, continue to develop a lightweight integrated sight that incorporates day/night, I², thermal, laser range finder and a “heads-up” display capability.

Figure 7. Israeli wheel: left side.

Figure 8. Unit fabricated AN/PEQ-2 mount.

Figure 9. Unit fabricated mount with Mil Std. M1913 rail.

Issue #2: Portability

Discussion: Soldiers would like a lighter and shorter M2; however, they do not want to reduce the reliability, durability, range, or lethality in the process.

Recommendations: Develop a lighter weapon system without sacrificing the reliability, durability, range or lethality.

Issue #3: Barrels

Discussion: Soldiers would like a faster cooling barrel. Barrels tend to heat-up quickly and they cause problems with thermal sights (heat blooms) or when soldiers change out barrels. They would also like to have a quick-change barrel that eliminates the need to perform “head-space and timing.”

Recommendations: Develop a fast cooling/quick-change barrel for the M2 that eliminates “head-space and timing.”

Issue #4: Weapon’s Functioning

Discussion: Soldiers would like the M2 to have the capability to fire from the closed bolt position. They feel that this would increase the system’s reliability because it would not allow dirt, dust and foreign debris to get inside the weapon’s receiver. Soldiers would also like to have a positive safety selector for the trigger mechanism. They feel that this would prevent accidental discharges when they are traveling over rough terrain while manning the weapon system. Additionally, soldiers would like the M2 to have better flash reduction. This would especially be helpful while conducting missions during limited visibility.

Recommendations: In the near term, develop a positive safety mechanism for the M2 and a flash reducer/suppressor for the M2. In the far term, develop a weapon system that is capable of firing in the closed bolt position.

Issue #5: Weapon’s Mount/Platform

Discussion: Soldiers would like a lighter tripod that would incorporate a better T&E mechanism. They feel that the M2’s Tripod is both heavy and cumbersome. Soldiers do not like to dismount the weapon system because the work that is involved in mounting the gun on the tripod is so labor intensive. Soldiers also complained about the pedestal mounts on their vehicles (especially HMMWVs). They said the mounts are not holding up well under the stress of the weapon system. It is evident that the rough terrain and road conditions, compounded by the added ammunition weight, stress the mounts to failure.

Soldiers feel the mount should be more durable/robust and have a better interface with the vehicle. Additionally, soldiers expressed a desire to fire from within the vehicle (remote platform). They feel that they are too exposed to enemy fire when they are either in the turret of a vehicle or standing in the back of a HWMMV.

Recommendations: In the near term, develop a lighter tripod for the M2 that incorporates a more effective T&E mechanism. For the far term, develop a remote firing station that would allow the gunner to engage targets while inside the vehicle (overhead protection).

Section II. b. M2 Caliber .50 Machine Gun Ammunition

Issue #1: Larger ready box

Discussion: Users would like greater round carrying capacity on mounts. Many were observed to have improvised a higher capacity feed system from the MK64 feed tray or used an M548 40-MM ammunition box holding 200 plus rounds of ammunition. In the latter configuration, it was determined that total weight of ammunition on the system may decrease mount life by increasing stresses. The additional weight of over 70 pounds could cause weld failure over rough terrain.

Recommendations: Use of M548 cans have been already been provided to the field. Continue study on mounts to assess load carrying capability and long term durability.

Figure 10. Metal fatigue exhibited by mounting the MK46 ammo can with 200+ rounds.

Figure 11. M2 with MK46 ammo can.

Issue #2: Ammunition packaging

Discussion: Coupled with the above there was a general consensus that greater or larger ammo pack outs (packaged at the ammo plant) are needed. Users would like to see 200 round boxes to reduce exposure time in engagements during re-linking of ammunition.

Recommendations: Refer need to packaging for assessment of loading profile and human engineering aspects.

Issue #3: Saboted Light Armor Piercing (SLAP) availability

Discussion: Caliber.50 SLAP ammunition although available throughout the supply system was initially not available to the soldiers. A shipment enroute to the theater was turned back 11 March 2003. Subsequently actions were initiated to supply another quantity, which arrived early April. Reviews of assets in the field indicate that ammunition is still unavailable.

Recommendations: Immediately provide the .50 caliber SLAP to units in theatre.

Section III. M240B MMG and 7.62 Ammunition

General discussion:

From the soldiers stand point this is an excellent weapon. Soldiers acknowledged that the weapon performed well in all engagements and functioned reliably in the AOR. Its reliability was the number one characteristic that machine gunners and leaders praised about the system and are unwilling to trade. The soldiers were very impressed with the system’s durability, accuracy, rate of fire, rail system (both front and feed tray). The rails provide the flexibility to mount various weapon accessories.

Soldiers indicated that the associated ammunition was very reliable and they were confident with the rate of fire and the lethality of the 7.62 ammunition. A review of the quality of ammunition delivered to the field did not suggest any significant problems or issues. The only cautionary item was that some rounds were loose in the cartridge case. Only one unit reported this with one lot of ammunition they were recently issued. It could not be found for analysis but will be recorded as an anecdotal issue to be provided to the production facility. The main issue from the soldiers was the limited ability to carry ammunition.

Although the weapon functioned well under the combat conditions in the AOR, soldiers would like a number of improvements. These improvements are as follows:

Section III. a. M240B MMG

Issue#1: Weight and Length.

Discussion: All Machinegun Crews (Gunners and Assistant Gunners) expressed that they were over burdened by the system components. The machinegun is cumbersome to Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) while conducting clearing operations. The typical gun crew was a two-man crew and carried the M240 MMG, tripod with T&E, spare barrel and ammunition basic load. Soldiers desire a variant with a shorter barrel and collapsible or folding stock for better portability. Several leaders expressed a desire for a mix of short and standard barrels to configure the gun in accordance with Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain – Time Available (METT-T). They were willing to trade weight and length for range and accuracy to no less than 800 meters, but without any loss of reliability. This corresponds to the doctrinal employment of the machineguns in grazing fire (600m).

Recommendations: Continue with the M240 MMG weight reduction effort and explore the feasibility of a shorter variant similar to the M60E. Accelerate the Lightweight Tripod program development and fielding.

Issue #2: Ammo Carrying System(s)

Discussion: Machine Gunners (MG), Assistant Gunners (AG) and Ammo Bearers (AB) need a better system to carry the gun’s basic load of ammunition. With the exception of one division, all the crews were not issued a carrying system specifically for machinegun ammunition. Several units purchased commercial products from London Bridge, Black Hawk, or fabricated a system. Some used CamelBak pouches or a commercial assault pack. Gunners expressed a desire to carry 50-100 rounds on the gun. None of the units interviewed were issued the Combat Ammunition Pack (CAP). The AGs and ABs need a system to carry 200-300 rounds of ammunition, continuously linked, in order to quickly provide ready ammunition to the machinegun when placed into action. Several of the commercial or fabricated systems did not protect the ammunition sufficiently and resulted in improperly seated rounds and dirty ammunition. Moreover, several of these systems did not integrate well with the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA).

Recommendations: Accelerate the fielding of the MOLLE machine gunner configuration and ammo bag that integrates with the IBA. Accelerate development and fielding of the CAP to all fielded machineguns immediately.

Figure 12. Tactical Tailor AB bag; worn. Note: ammo feeds to the right.

Figure 13. M240 Gunner with SAW pouches attached to the IBA.

Figure 14. Camelbak pouch used to carry ammunition.

Issue #3: Spare Barrel Bag

Discussion: The spare barrel bag is inadequate. The spare barrel bag is a good concept, but requires several improvements. The spare barrel bags observed had evidence of burns from hot barrels and all the FASTEX Buckles were broken and unserviceable. The team observed field expedient methods to secure the items in the spare barrel bag. Soldiers recommended changing the buckles to metal friction buckles instead of plastic. Carrying the bag was awkward and several AGs expressed a need for improvement. Additionally, the heat resistant material surface area is inadequate – the internal nylon material is easily burned or melted by the hot barrel. Some AGs are using ammunition can lids to insulate the hot barrel from the bag. There is low confidence in the current heat resistant material. Additionally, the AGs need the capability to stow a hot barrel into the spare barrel bag and displace to another firing position. Several AGs recommended sewing pockets lined and insulated with heat resistant material to insert the hot barrel into and quickly configure it for movement.

Recommendations: Replace the unserviceable spare barrel bags with bags modified to meet operational needs. Change the buckles to a more durable and reliable fastening system. Line and insulate the entire internal portion of the bag to provide a larger surface area to place a hot barrel during quick barrel change and prevent burning. Add sewn-in pockets on the outer edges of the flap to secure the barrel and quickly configure the bag for movement – “grab and go.”

Figure 15. Spare barrel bag with broken clips and expedient carrying strap.

Figure 16. Spare barrel bag; open. Soldiers desire a bag with larger heat resistant surface - to the include storage compartments.

Figure 17. M240B spare barrel on ammo can lids. Soldiers are using ammo cans to prevent burning the spare barrel bag.

Figure 18. Internal spare barrel bag melted portion - vicinity the storage compartment.

Issue #4: Bipod

Discussion: The bipod lacks a height adjustment and the feet are inadequate for MOUT operations (slides on concrete surfaces). The current bipod has a fixed height and slides when fired in urban terrain. The gunners need to adjust the bipod legs in order to engage targets from different elevations or sloped surfaces.

Recommendations: Accelerate the bipod program for immediate fielding.

Issue #5: Sights

Discussion: Soldiers voiced that the M145 Machine Gun Optic (MGO) required more magnification and a wider field of view (FOV). The soldiers could not clearly acquire targets beyond 500 meters with the current MGO magnification (3x). The AN/PVS-4 was too heavy and bulky and required the gunner to dismount the primary day sight (MGO). A lighter night sight is greatly desired. Soldiers also expressed that a lightweight integrated day/night sight that incorporates a laser aiming pointer capability that would preclude mounting and dismounting a number of different sights or potentially losing bore sight.

Recommendations: Develop a lightweight integrated day/night sight that incorporates a laser aiming pointer capability.

Issue #6: Receiver Assembly

Discussion: Soldiers would like the M240B MMG to fire from a closed bolt position. They feel this would increase the system’s reliability because it would not allow dirt and foreign debris to get inside the receiver. Soldiers also indicated that the sear tended to wear faster than other parts on the weapon system. The expended brass also accumulated at the bottom of the gun which interfered with the function of the T&E and burned gunners. Gunners and AGs recommended deflecting the brass toward the right front which will prevent excessive brass build up beneath the gun.

Recommendations: Investigate the feasibility of incorporating a closed bolt operating system into the design of the M240B MMG. Conduct an engineering study to check the reliability of the sear and if required provide a more robust sear for the weapon system. Provide a system that ejects brass away from the bottom of the gun.

Issue #7: Barrel Assembly

Discussion: Soldiers desire a more durable barrel assembly that dissipates heat more efficiently enabling them to fire more rounds between barrel changes. Heat shields consistently fell off the barrel during barrel change-over. The majority of the gunners interviewed remove the heat shield altogether. Soldiers also experienced barrel handles breaking during barrel change over on live fire training in preparation for combat operation. Soldiers expressed the desire to reduce the flash signature in order to reduce detection and increase their survivability.

Recommendations: Provide the M240B MMG with a barrel assembly that dissipates heat more efficiently with an improved flash hider, more durable heat shields, and a more robust handle.

Issue #8: Buttstock

Discussion: Soldiers desire a more durable buttstock that incorporates a shoulder rest. The team observed a number of buttstocks with broken sling attaching points. Soldiers resorted to field expedient methods in rigging the slings to the weapon. Additionally, they expressed a desire to have a shoulder rest incorporated into the buttstock to stabilize the machinegun – like the M60 MG.

Recommendations: Develop a more durable buttstock that incorporates the desired capabilities.

Figure 19. Split M240 buttstock.

Figure 20. Butt plate separating from the M240B buttstock.

Figure 21. M240B buttstock; full view. Note broken butt plate and sling attaching point.

Issue #9: Sling and sling attaching points

Discussion: The sling does not interface with the soldier well. The sling is not wide enough and has inadequate padding. The soldier experiences a lot of discomfort from the sling during dismounted operations. Additionally, the team observed several broken sling attachment points (front and rear) and sling clips. Soldiers are using field expedient methods to attach slings to the weapon or purchasing commercial slings.

Recommendation: Provide more robust sling attachment points and a sling with wider and thicker padding.

Section III. b. M240B Machinegun 7.62-MM Ammunition

Issue #1: Improperly seated rounds on the 7.62 belt.

Discussion: During pre-combat checks the M240B gunners and assistant gunners said they are receiving five to ten rounds (out the box) that are not properly seated in the links.

Recommendations: Notify production facility of this observation and examine if there is anything inherent to the process that causes this event.

Issue #2: Tracer burn-out.

Discussion: Although tracer burnout of the 7.62 is visible out to 900 meters, the soldiers said that when engaging targets 1000 to 1800 would like to see an increased capability in the tracer burnout so they can adjust the round on target.

Recommendations: Conduct an engineering design review of the tracer and tracer charging process to determine if there is the capability to increase performance.

Issue #3: Blank ammunition reliability.

Discussion: Although not an issue for operations in OIF, the soldiers and leaders of the units interviewed said that blank ammunition lacks reliability. Practically all groups interviewed asked if something could be done to stop the frequent malfunctions associated with firing blanks through the M240B.

Recommendations: Conduct analysis of cartridge feed path and determine if it is possible to optimize the cartridge weight distribution and/or angle of the crimp or a longer neck blank.

Issue #4: Dim tracer.

Discussion: Dim tracer availability was non-existent to the units. The units wanted to have it so that they could use it in conjunction with all the night vision devices employed during OIF.

Recommendations: Dim trace has been developed for 7.62 mm and has been typed classified. Provide units with munitions capability and availability information as soon as possible. Make the munitions available for immediate issue in the AOR.

Issue #5: Armor piercing (AP)

Discussion: Units would have liked to have M993 ammunition for their engagements against light skinned vehicles and for employment at the numerous Traffic Control Points (TCP) they are manning.

Recommendations: The M993 has been typed classified and is a standard inventory item that units can order. Provide units with munitions capability and availability information as soon as possible. Make the munitions available for immediate issue in the AOR.

Section IV. M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) and 5.56 Ammunition

General discussion:

The M249 SAW was well liked for its rate of fire. In both the automatic rifle and light machinegun roles, the M249 SAW was effective against personnel targets from 20 meters out to 600 meters. It was considerably less effective against vehicle targets.

The 100-round soft pack was universally praised. Its size and durability made it the choice over the 200-round plastic box whenever practical. Those units with Rail Adapter Systems and upgraded feed tray covers were very happy with the ability to mount various accessories to the weapon. However, some integration issues still remain with specific items. The M5 collapsible buttstock received high marks. Most soldiers appreciated the significant reduction in length when collapsed. Some expressed a desire for a vertical surface when collapsed, similar to the M4 buttstock; others didn’t feel it to be necessary.

Soldiers indicated that ammunition was delivered in satisfactory condition. There were no mis-marked or mislabeled wire bounds or cans. Additionally there was no significant indication of dented or incorrectly manufactured ammunition being delivered. However in one instance a soldier did offer up a round he felt came damaged from the ammo box. Examination of that round did indicate what could be called a tool mark on the body of the case. The round was being retained for further assessment.

While the capability provided by the SAW was well liked, the weapon itself came under criticism in several areas especially for its durability and problems with the 200 round ammunition box. Issues raised are detailed below:

Section IV. a. M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW)

Issue #1: Bipod Durability

Discussion: The bipod legs of the M249 SAW are considered by the soldiers to be inadequate for their intended purpose. To control the weapon effectively the soldier must apply forward pressure to the gun. The bipod legs can’t withstand this pressure and bend easily. The legs wear at the hinge point causing them to spread wider over time. The collar is designed to allow some motion in cant, but it wears to the point of rotating freely. Most soldiers cited the M240B bipod as the standard for durability.

Recommendations: Redesign the bipod to withstand the rigors of combat operations. Address the interference between the SAW’s front Rail Adapter System and the rearward stowage of the bipod legs.

Issue #2 Maintainability

Discussion: The SAW has many small parts that come off easily. Rear take-down pins, side leaf spring, and feed tray cover springs are among the pieces that are too easily lost. One soldier stated it plainly, “this weapon was clearly not designed with the infantry in mind.” Soldiers note that the SAW requires a special tool to remove the gas regulator, which is a routine maintenance task. This is in contrast to the M240B that has a similar part but requires no tool.

Figure 22. M249 SAW field expedient repair.

Figure 23. M249 SAW with missing trigger guard.

Recommendations: Redesign the current weapon system or develop a suitable replacement.

Issue #3 Materials

Discussion: The durability of materials of the M249 SAW caused soldiers concern. The SAW was very difficult to keep from corroding. A company commander stated that he has learned to expect the SAWs in his arms room to have a small amount of rust. This is in drastic contrast to every other weapon he is responsible for. The sling attachment point of both the original buttstock and the M5 collapsible buttstock gets worn away by the sling’s hook. Soldiers feel that the weapon should outlast the sling. A direct support maintenance small arms repairman noted a similar situation between the operating group and the weapon’s receiver. He observed several SAWs where the internal guide rails are worn and cracked before the bolt group. This condition requires a code-out of the weapon instead of replacement of the operating parts. These material issues will grow with time as the Army’s inventory of M249 SAWs age.

Recommendations: Redesign the current weapon system or develop a suitable replacement for this weapon system.

Issue #4: Half Cock Safety

Discussion: Units indicated that the M249 SAW can accidentally discharge when the weapon is cocked only halfway and placed on safe. When opening the feed tray cover in such a state, the bolt may ride forward, chamber a round, and fire. This problem is exacerbated by leaders’ desire to have all weapons’ safety selectors set on “safe.” The SAW cannot be placed on safe when the bolt is forward on an empty chamber, even though that is the safest state for the weapon.

Recommendations: In the near term, review leader training and weapon employment doctrine to allow gunners to place the M249 SAW bolt forward on an empty chamber. It is insufficient to have written warnings published to alert soldiers to this hazard. In the long term, modify the M249 SAW to prevent this problem altogether and/or the development community should consider a suitable replacement for this weapon system.

Issue #5 Optics/Sights

Discussion: Soldiers expressed a desire to have light machine gun optic for the M249. Some units interviewed had purchased commercial scopes for their weapons which gunners stated improved their weapon’s effectiveness while engaging enemy targets. Some soldiers also stated a desire to have a day/night sight that included an IR/active laser pointing capability (eliminate AN/PEQ-2). Soldiers complained that the front sight on the M249 was difficult to adjust. The majority of soldiers interviewed did not have the special tool that is required to adjust the front sight (difficult to obtain/acquire). They suggested that the front sight should be designed more like the M240B’s front sight where it is open on top and provides easy access to make the necessary adjustments (does not require a special tool).

Figure 24. ACOG on an M249 SAW.

Recommendations: Provide the soldier with a lightweight machine gun optic and develop an integrated day/night optic that incorporates an IR/active laser capability. Modify the front sight for the M249 that provides easy access and adjustments by the operator.

Issue #6: Weight and Length.

Discussion: Several SAW Gunners expressed a desire for a lighter and shorter variant of the M249, which incorporated a vertical collapsing/adjustable buttstock, a shorter barrel and a pistol grip. This variant would be better suited for conducting clearing operations in a MOUT environment. Several leaders desired a mix of short and standard barrels to configure the gun in accordance with the METT-T. They were willing to trade the weight and length for the range and accuracy, but without losing reliability/durability in the process.

Recommendation: Provide a wider distribution/fielding of the M5 buttstock and paratrooper barrel to automatic riflemen. Continue with the Lightweight Machinegun and the M249 adjustable buttstock Soldier Enhancement Programs (SEP). Provide soldiers with a forward pistol grip for their weapon.

Issue #7: Spare Barrel Bag

Discussion: The spare barrel bag is inadequate. Soldiers indicated that the nylon spare barrel bag would melt if it comes in contact with a hot barrel. Soldiers cannot change barrels and take the hot barrel when they continue to move. Soldiers would like to have a more durable, heat resistant and “user friendly” carrying system for the spare barrel.

Recommendations: Develop a more durable, heat resistant and “user friendly” spare barrel bag for the M249

Section IV. b. M249 Light Machine Gun Ammunition

Issue #1: 200 Round Box:

Issue # 1a: Interface

Discussion: During OIF as well as live fire exercises and blank fire exercises at home stations, soldiers indicated frustration with the green plastic 200 round ammunition box falling off the M249 Machine gun. They contribute it to the following:

The plastic clip that is used to interface with the weapon is not durable enough. The metal pin that holds the clip in place breaks consistently during Individual Movement Techniques (IMT), and fire and movement.

Issue # 1b: Excessive noise

Discussion: During OIF while moving through a MOUT environment the soldiers indicated that the plastic box makes excessive noise with ammo in it whether full or half full. This violates noise discipline for the squad and puts them in a position of vulnerability to the enemy when moving. To compensate for this they have been adding moleskin and cardboard to the interior of the boxes.

Issue # 1c: Portability

Discussion: The box is awkward and bulky. When a soldier is trying to put the M249 into action when reacting to contact, the box restricts the gunner from obtaining a good sight picture of the enemy while returning fire when elevating. The bulkiness of the box also hinders freedom of movement and manipulation of the weapon in the bipod configuration, and while mounted on the vehicular mounts.

Issue # 1d: Durability

Discussion: The unit would like to have a more durable plastic box. The plastic box received by the soldiers is sometimes cracked and, if not, cracks during missions. During pre-combat inspection (PCI) the soldiers take the rounds out of the plastic box and put them into nylon 5.56mm 100 round soft packs. They concluded this is a more reliable means of carry and would rather not see a soldier moving with his weapon with the belt of ammunition dragging behind him.

Figure 25. M249 SAW box top view; weak spring clip.

Figure 26. Soldiers inserted cardboard (MRE box) to silence the SAW box.

Figure 27. Broken SAW box with expedient repair/reinforcement.

Figure 28. SAW box with field expedient repair and reinforcement. Note tape on the spring clip.

Recommendations: The weak interfaces were previously addressed in a change of the plastic ammunition box design. Some of the problems encountered may have been due to issue of the old design ammunition boxes. Eliminate the “old” 200 round green and black box from the inventory and use the “improved” 200 round box as pack out improvement or procure 200 round soft pack through the SEP.

Issue #2: Dim trace

Discussion: During night operations the soldiers said that they would like to have a dim tracer in a 5.56 round. This would allow them to utilize night optics in the squad more effectively and it would leave less of a visual signature for the enemy to direct its fire.

Issue # 3 Armor piercing

Discussion: During OIF the soldiers encountered a wide variety of light-skinned vehicles while on the move in a HMMWV, patrolling through the streets, or on a tactical combat patrol. They expressed a need to have the AP round configured in a 4 ball, 1 Tracer mix so that they could effectively engage light skinned vehicles and material threats.

Recommendations: Configure AP ammunition for the SAW. M995 has been typed classified and is a standard inventory item that units can order. Provide units with munitions capability and availability information as soon as possible. Make the munitions available for immediate issue in the AOR.

Issue # 4 100/200 Pack-out

Discussion: Based on the durability and reliability of the plastic box and the fact that the soldiers are taking the rounds out of the box and putting them into a 100 round soft pack, most of the soldiers interviewed requested to have the rounds configured in the same manner as the 7.62mm 4 ball,1 tracer cardboard container pack out.

Recommendations: Provide pack out configuration to the user with the 100 round soft pack for the M249 in a 100 round cardboard box with bandoleer to enable the user to self load soft packs based on the mission.

Issue # 5 Unseated rounds

Discussion: Units expressed a concern about the links and its reliability to hold and maintain the rounds seated in the belt during movements. They said they constantly have to check the rounds that are exposed from the gun to the ammunition carrying pack to ensure they have not moved during movement.

Recommendations: Investigate delinking and failures to maintain proper seating, then identify, and recommend possible solutions. Study this issue in both mounted and dismounted configurations and use all fielded versions and configurations of the M249

Chapter 3. Individual Weapons

Section I. M16 Series of Assault Weapons, 5.56mm Ammunition, and Accessories

General discussion:

The US Army executed OIF with three variants of the M16 series of assault weapons: the M16A2, the M16A4, and the M4 Carbine (hereafter referred to as M16 series). The latter two were configured as Modular Weapon Systems in units so equipped. A fourth version, the M4A1, was used by Special Operations Forces but was not encountered by the assessment team.

The M16 series received widespread praise for its durability and reliability. A few soldiers expressed a desire to be able to fire the weapon after pulling it out of the dirt (“like you can do with the AK” was the perception), but there were no trends of poor reliability. This may be attributed in part to the ease of maintenance reported by the soldiers. While keeping the weapons clean in this environment was a continuous requirement it was not considered to be a difficult one.

Most soldiers considered The M16 series to be very accurate regardless of the version used or the sighting system employed. One sniper team spotter employed his M16A4 (equipped with a high powered scope) against targets at 600 and 800 meters with first round hits in each case.

Those units equipped with the Rail Adapter System (RAS) were very happy with its modularity and flexibility of employment. Most units allowed soldiers to place accessories on the Modular Weapon System where they best suited the individual. Some units prescribed weapon configuration in their standard operating procedures. Many soldiers stated that the RAS should be an integral part of the weapon rather than an adapter kit.

In the discussion with field units there were no quality issues with ammunition from the production facility. Consensus of the troops is that this weapon/ammunition is effective for its intended purposes. Ammunition was correctly marked and packaged and there were no incidents of defective materials, damaged or dented rounds etc.

Issues raised by soldiers are detailed below:

Section I. a. M16 Series of Assault

Issue #1: Magazines

Discussion: The majority of the issues experienced with the M16 series rifles in theatre were attributable to the magazines. Most problems reported occurred from loading the M16 series magazine with 30 rounds. One problem was that the magazine is difficult to seat in the weapon with the bolt closed and the magazine tends to spread apart at the top, increasing the difficulty with insertion. Most soldiers relieved these problems by loading less than 30 rounds. One soldier recommended 25 rounds to ease the math associated with ammunition status. No one complained about the reduced capacity.

Recommendations: In the short term, advise the AOR to fill magazines with a maximum of 28 rounds and provide units with magazines issued with RFI. In the long term, the quality and the design of the M16 series magazine must undergo review. Combat Developers should consider whether 30 rounds per magazine are operationally required.

Issue #2: Sling

Discussion: Sling requirements generally fell into two categories: a combat sling that keeps the weapon at the ready when hands free, and a carrying sling that keeps the weapon out of the way during support tasks. Many different commercial slings were present among the units in theatre.

Figure 29. Preferred hands-free sling.

Figure 30. Buttstock sling (fabricated).

Figure 31. Three-point combat sling.

Figure 33. Fabricated hands-free sling and attaching system.

Recommendations: Provide the soldier a tactical sling that provides the capabilities addressed above and attaches to the load carrying system and field through RFI.

Issue #3: M4 Basis of Issue

Discussion: The M4 is by far the preferred individual weapon across the theatre of operations. Units that don’t have it want it. Mechanized infantry units requested the M4 due to the cramped conditions of the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the house-to-house, room-to-room, Urban Operations missions frequently conducted. Combat Support and Combat Service Support soldiers described the difficulty of performing their MOS-specific missions while wielding the longer M16. This was especially true for drivers of all vehicle types. Frequent mounting and dismounting during convoys and engaging targets from within the vehicle (i.e. security halts) underscored the need for the shorter weapon.

Figure 32. M16 from within a non-tactical vehicle.

Recommendations: Near term replace the M16 with the M4 as the standard issue weapon. Long term develop a more compact rifle that fulfills the needs stated above.

Issue #4: Distribution of Back Up Iron Sight (BUIS)

Discussion: Many units equipped with the M68 Close Combat Optic did not have the BUIS. As a result, many soldiers retained the carrying handle on their M16A2s and mounted the M68 in front of it and/or attached the carrying handle to the RAS. This is clearly less than optimal. Some units purchased commercial back up sights with varying degrees of satisfaction (i.e. Knight’s Armament).

Figure 33. Carrying handle attached to the RAS.

Recommendations: Increase production of the BUIS and accelerate its fielding so that every M68 equipped weapon has a BUIS as soon as possible and/or as part of RFI.

Section I. b. M16 series rifle ammunition

Issue # 1: Dim Tracer

Discussion: The units interviewed expressed the need for leaders to have the ability to employ Dim Tracer. Leaders said they would like to have the capability of directing fire and engaging targets without presenting a visible signature of their location and where they want the fire to be concentrated. The units say this goes hand in hand with them owning the night.

Recommendations: In the near term, define the requirement and conduct an engineering study for 7.62mm and caliber .50 dim tracer technology applicability to 5.56mm. In the far term, develop 5.56mm dim tracer ammunition, if appropriate.

Issue # 2: Armor Piercing Round

Discussion: Units interviewed expressed the need to have an armor piercing round so that they could engage material and light skinned vehicular targets at long ranges.

Recommendations: The M995 armor piercing round has been typed classified and is a standard inventory item that units can order. Ensure wider notification of field on availability of the M995 and specifically notify the AOR as soon as possible. Make the munitions available for immediate issue in the AOR.

Issue # 3 Lethality

Discussion: There have been many engagements with the M855 spanning ranges from 10 feet to 250 meters against soft targets (non-armored individuals) during OIF. Observations from the field cover many different responses from “I shot him in the gut and he ran away”, “I had to put multiple rounds in him to stop him”, to “I shot him in the chest and he went down” and “I shot him in the head and he dropped on the spot”. There are many different views on the lethality of this round ranging from the need for a heavier bullet (the need for more stopping power), to “We have no complaints with the M855 ammunition. It is satisfying the operational need.” One brigade of soldiers interviewed made a very interesting statement concerning the lethality of the M855. Their focus groups indicated that based on proper target acquisition with the improved M68 (CCO), shot placement, basic rifle marksmanship, and firing controlled pairs they were very satisfied with the round’s performance/ terminal effects.

Recommendations: A Government Lethality IPT has been stood up to standardize GEL block testing and an engineering study will be conducted extensive, soft target terminal effects of COTS and military 5.56mm ammunition. The characteristics of each bullet terminal performance will be determined. Based on requirements and using the engineering information, a new round should be type classified and made available.

Issue # 4: Indented Primers

Discussion: There were a high number of indented M855 primers in OIF. Operationally each time a cartridge is chambered in an M16 Series Rifle or M4 Series Carbine, a slight indentation is made on the primer. This is caused by contact of the free-floating firing pin against the cartridge primer as the bolt closes. This is a function associated with normal operation of the weapon. While this may not cause a problem for rounds fired after only one chambering, it is very common for the chambered round to be ejected unused and reinserted into magazine. For example, infantry soldiers returning to their Bradley must clear their weapons before mounting the vehicle. The same round may endure multiple strikes over the course of a mission. It was observed that the indent is more pronounced in the M4 than in the M16. It is unclear at this time what effect this has on the ammunition’s performance but it is clear the psychological effect is negative. There is a fear that the round may accidentally discharge after too many chamberings. Others fear that the round will be rendered a dud after too many chamberings. Units have attempted to deal with this issue by rotating the ejected cartridges within the magazine, a time consuming burden they should not have to endure.

In discussions with weapons experts it was found that the Army conducted tests to investigate the effects of multiple detents on 5.56mm ammunition. Standard issue cartridges were repeatedly chambered and ejected up to 100 times each, at ambient conditions, at 150 deg F and using weapons infiltrated with sand. No slam fire, or accidental discharges occurred. However, cartridges are not intended to be repeatedly re-chambered as this may de-sensitize the primer and/or deform the body of the cartridge case sufficiently to cause misfires. The potential for a misfire may occur in as few as 10 to 20 lock and load cycles of the same cartridge. No misfire occurrences were directly observed from indentations but soldiers relayed some occurrences of accidental discharges when going through the clearing procedures and one soldier experienced a misfire – from a round cycled through the chamber numerous times. Further testing is planned to more accurately quantify these conditions and establish the need of a Maintenance Advisory Message (MAM).

Recommendations: In the near term, publish a Ground Precautionary Message to the field detailing the issue with a recommended interim solution (maximum safe chamberings). In the mid to long term, the engineering community should determine the cause of the indenting, and its effect on the ammunition.

Section I. c. Rifle Accessories

M68 Close Combat Optic

General discussion:

Most units interviewed that were equipped with the M68 had the first generation model. Some units had received the latest model that has incorporated many improvements. These two models will be referred to as Gen I and Gen II, respectively. The consensus across the AOR is that the M68 provides a significant increase in capability over the traditional post-and-aperture mechanical sight. At least one unit elected not to employ the M68 because they received them just prior to deployment and were more comfortable fighting the way they trained—with traditional iron sights. Both models were praised for the speed of target acquisition and accuracy. Those soldiers who were comfortable with keeping both eyes open during engagements felt that technique provided superior situational awareness. Units that had a Small Arms Master Gunner expressed greater confidence in the M68 and showed a better understanding of its capabilities. The Gen I suffered from poor reliability and drew much criticism. The Gen II model was praised for its long battery life. Many soldiers stated they had gone over thirty days without changing batteries, despite an on/off switch that constantly turns on inadvertently. Soldiers were confident in the M68’s ability to return to zero when removed and replaced (both models). The Gen II model was also praised for its zero retention despite the rough handling associated with combat operations. Boresight procedures were not considered to be burdensome, and the resulting alignments generally lasted for the duration of the war. Reconfirming bore alignment was the exception, not the rule.

Figure 34. Gen I M68 with condensation.

Figure 35. Broken rail grabber as a result of contact (buttstroke) with a combatant.

The issues listed below are common to both Gen I & II models. Those issues raised regarding Gen I models that were fixed in Gen II (such as battery life) are omitted from this report.

Issue #1: On/Off Switch Detent

Discussion: The On/Off switch constantly turns on inadvertently. This problem was reported universally. Soldiers had to constantly check to see if the M68 was turned on. The problem is critical in the Gen I model because of its short battery life, leading to a lack of confidence that the unit would be fully mission capable for an entire engagement. Some soldiers also expressed a desire for better tactile feel when adjusting brightness.

Recommendations: Change the switch design to require a more deliberate action. The pull switch of the AN/PVS-7 was cited as a good example.

Issue #2: Size of Red Dot

Discussion: The size of the dot masks personnel targets at approximately 300 meters. It is also difficult with closer targets to distinguish between center-of-mass and the target’s extremities. Several soldiers cited that a “circle-dot” reticle hastened aiming because it was more prominent.

Recommendations: Explore other aim point/reticle patterns that provide for both reflexive engagements and more precise long distance aiming.

Issue #3: Maximum Brightness

Discussion: The bright ambient light conditions of the Iraqi theatre often overpowered the red dot aim point of the M68. Soldiers equipped with the Back Up Iron Sight employed it to compensate. Those without either resorted to using the carrying handle, or engaged by “walking” rounds onto target. On the other hand, soldiers cited that the Anti Reflection Device reduced the glare and made the red dot more visible.

Recommendations: Provide brighter LEDs or incorporate ambient light collection to amplify the aim point’s brightness in proportion to the ambient conditions.

Magnified Optics

Discussion: Individual soldiers and some units have purchased magnified optics with personal or operational funds for an increased capability. The Trijicon ACOG, available from the SOPMOD kit was common. Many soldiers purchased scopes on their own to attach to the carrying handle of their M16/M4s allowing both a magnified scope and the use of the iron sights. (One soldier was seen with an Iraqi sight unit from an RPG launcher rigged to his weapon). Soldiers so equipped indicated they enjoyed better target identification, better sight picture and alignment, and more accurate shot placement. Leaders praised the target detection/location ability of their squads. When asked about close quarters battle (CQB), the response was mixed between those who felt magnification hindered reflexive firing and those who had no trouble with it. Most soldiers expressed interest in an optic that could switch from CQB to magnified precision. When asked how much extra size and/or weight they would accept for such a capability, the consensus was that they would accept some reasonable amount of growth. The combination of M68 and AN/PVS-14 was cited in one group as a target weight limit. It should be noted that magnification is not universally desired but is a significant trend that should be addressed by the development community. It also supports the emerging Squad Designated Marksman concept.

Figure 36. Soldier procured magnified optic.

Figure 37. M16A4 MWS with extensive soldier procured accessories.

Recommendations: Pursue development of a combination unity power/magnified optic.

Integration of Night Fighting Capabilities

Discussion: When the soldiers were encouraged to think creatively as if they were “king for a day,” they offered other capabilities they’d like to have integrated into a sighting system. Day/Night capability was a common theme. Some suggested IR aiming similar to the AN/AN/PAQ-4. Some suggested image intensification (I2) or thermal night vision sensors (or both) be incorporated and employed at the turn of a switch. They were generally averse to such a device if it would end up being large and bulky. But they concluded if it could be done compactly, it would eliminate the need for multiple devices and the (perceived) loss of accuracy when swapping between them.

Recommendations: Pursue development of an integrated day/night optic.

Aiming Lasers

Discussion: Although soldiers praised the capabilities that the AN/PEQ-2 provided them, they had concerns about its durability. The pressure switch on the AN/PEQ-2 needs to be more durable and reliable. A large majority of the soldiers interviewed did not have a pressure switch attached to their AN/PEQ-2 because they had all broken off or didn’t work properly. Soldiers stated that the pressure switch cable broke at the interface point on the AN/PEQ-2 (needs to be more flexible). Soldiers also had problems with either the cable being too long or too short when mounted on their crew served weapon systems. This seemed to interfere with either the operation of the AN/PEQ-2 or the operation of the weapon system itself. Soldiers felt that a remote switch that was integrated into the pistol grip of the weapon would solve the problem. Additionally, a number of soldiers complained that the AN/PEQ-2’s center fastening screw would loosen too easily; causing loss of bore sight. Soldiers felt that a better interface connector for the AN/PEQ-2 is needed. Finally, the team interviewed a number of soldiers that had broken or missing caps and covers on their AN/PEQ-2.

Figure 38. A fabricated front pistol grip with integrated pressure switches and tactical light.

Figure 39. Borelight attached to an M16A4 MWS and used as a visible laser.

Recommendations: Conduct a durability study and develop a pistol grip with integrated pressure switches.

Tactical Lights

Discussion: Several soldiers and units purchased Surefire Tactical Lights with personal or unit funds. There were a number of models and types used. The need for tactical lights is universal for clearing operations in urban terrain and vehicle searches throughout Iraq. Several soldiers were observed with flashlights taped to their weapons and some using the Weapon Flashlight Mount. But all soldiers described using the tactical light for temporary target incapacitation.

Recommendations: In the near term, provide soldiers with a tactical light that suits their operational need as part of RFI. In the mid to long term, define the requirements for a tactical light.

Section II. M203 Grenade Launcher and 40mm Grenade Ammunition

General discussion:

Generally the field discussions indicated that the weapon system performed well. Soldiers felt that the M203 GL is a lightweight, compact and simple to use system that provides the squad with excellent firepower against point, area and defilade targets. They also liked the fact there is a variety of ammunition for the system and it is easy to clean and maintain. All of the soldiers interviewed were either using the leaf sight or no sight to engage targets. Soldiers that were experienced in using the M203GL had no difficulty engaging targets at ranges of 400 meters and beyond. The team did not talk to any soldiers that were utilizing the quadrant sight to engage targets. (Soldiers are unable to mount quadrant sight to M4/M16A4 when using the CCO).

There are two principle combat rounds the M583A1 White Star Parachute Round and the M433 High Explosive Dual Purpose Round. From a quality perspective ammunition provided to the troops from the production facilities is of good quality with no defects observed or reported. In no instance did the team hear of ammunition delivered to the field that would not present itself as functional. There was at least one incident of a dud round; however this was not repeated again in any our discussions with other units. It may be assumed that the levels of intensity of combat and soldier attention to the location of the enemy made any further observations moot.

Generally the field discussions indicated the weapon system performed as expected and with desired results, however further inquiry identified areas where the soldiers had recommendations for alternate uses and improvement. The following are issues raised by the soldiers:

Section II. a. M203 Grenade Launcher

Issue #1: Trigger/Safety Mechanism

Discussion: Soldiers experienced problems with the trigger mechanism functioning improperly. They had difficulty operating both the trigger and safety on the weapon due to dirt and dust build-up in the trigger housing. Soldiers were continually cleaning out the trigger and safety mechanisms to ensure they functioned properly. They also stated that the weapon’s safety was easily disengaged when it was bounced around in a vehicle or when it brushed up against their equipment. Because of this, most soldiers didn’t load their weapon until just prior to engaging enemy targets.

Recommendations: Improve the trigger/safety mechanism for the M203GL

Issue #2: Sights/Optics

Discussion: Currently, soldiers do not possess the capability to engage targets at night. Soldiers expressed a desire to have an illuminated leaf sight in order to provide them with a night firing capability. They would also like to have an integrated, dual-purpose, day/night optic that would allow them to accurately engage targets with both the 5.56mm and the 40mm weapon systems. Some of the soldiers interviewed had removed their leaf sight because the CCO interfered with the sight’s operation. Even with the leaf sight attached to the weapon, soldiers were still having difficulty accurately engaging targets. Soldiers desire a sight that matches the full range of the ammunition.

Recommendations: Provide a night firing capability (an illuminated leaf sight) and/or develop an integrated, dual-purpose, day/night optic for the M203GL.

Issue #3: Barrel Assembly

Discussion: Soldiers complained about the durability of the barrel assembly. There were numerous times throughout the interviews where soldiers stated the handgrips were falling off the weapon (heat caused glue to fail). Soldiers also experienced problems with the barrel latch activating too easily and causing the barrel not to seat properly causing rounds to fall out of the tube. Finally, soldiers felt that there is too much slack between the M203GL and the M4/M16 weapon system.

Recommendations: Develop an improved grenade launcher for the soldier.

Issue #4: Carrying Configuration

Discussion: Soldiers would like to have a better Ammunition Carrying Vest that interfaces better with the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). They complain that the cur